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Abstract
Quantum theory shares with classical probability theory many im-
portant properties. I show that this common core regards at least the
following six areas, and I provide details on each of these: the logic of
propositions, symmetry, probabilities, composition of systems, state
preparation and reductionism. The essential distinction between clas-
sical and quantum theory, on the other hand, is shown to be joint
decidability versus smoothness; for the latter in particular I supply
ample explanation and motivation. Finally, I argue that beyond quan-
tum theory there are no other generalisations of classical probability
theory that are relevant to physics.
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1 Introduction
Physical theories which are inherently probabilistic are notoriously diffi-
cult to grasp. Determinism seems so deeply ingrained in our thinking that
already classical concepts such as, say, the notion of entropy, maximum-
entropy priors or the second law of thermodynamics, albeit in principle
well understood [Jay89, Bal91, Bal92, RM96], trigger controversy up to this
day [Leb93, BCF+94] — let alone the conceptual basis of quantum theory
[TW01, Bel04, AR05]. The particular difficulties with physical theories that
are probabilistic are often aggravated by conceptual issues surrounding prob-
ability theory itself, where the profound antagonism between orthodox and
Bayesian schools has long clouded a clear view on the subject [Jay78].
Not surprisingly, then, the desire to understand the mathematical frame-
work of quantum theory in terms of simple, more easily comprehensible phys-
ical principles is almost as old as quantum theory itself [Zei99].1 Attempts at
such a principles-based reconstruction of quantum theory are legion. They
have been motivated by a desire to elucidate the conceptual basis and in-
terpretation of quantum theory; by the search for (or exclusion of) possible
modifications to quantum theory; or by the search for alternative mathe-
matical formulations of quantum theory that might be more conducive to,
say, a merger with general relativity into a quantum theory of gravity. The
following are a few examples without any claim to completeness.
Quantum logic is arguably the oldest of the reconstructive approaches.
First put forward by von Neumann in his famous 1932 monograph [vN32] and
in greater detail together with Birkhoff [BvN36], it was subsequently devel-
oped and promulgated most prominently by members of the Geneva School
[Jau68, Pir76]. Its basic idea is to consider a lattice of propositions that is
complete, orthocomplemented, weakly modular and atomic. Such a lattice
constitutes a generalisation of classical logic. The definition of the lattice
entails the existence of Boolean “and” and “or” operations which, however,
no longer need to obey classical rules such as distributivity. According to
Piron’s theorem [Pir64] all propositions within such a quantum logic can be
identified with subspaces of a Hilbert space over some skew field.
Almost at the same time the algebraic approach originated with the
1 As early as 1928 Hilbert, von Neumann and Nordheim wrote [HvNN28]: “Bei dieser
hohen Bedeutung der Quantenmechanik ist es ein dringendes Bedu¨rfnis, ihre Prinzipien so
klar und allgemein wie mo¨glich zu erfassen.” (In view of the high significance of quantum
mechanics it is an urgent desire to grasp its principles as clearly and generally as possible.)
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work of Jordan, von Neumann and Wigner [JvNW34]. It subsequently
evolved into the modern theory of C∗-algebras [GN43, Seg47, Thi81] which,
thanks to its mathematical rigor and prowess, has found successful appli-
cation in quantum field theory [HK64, Haa92]. Rather than a lattice of
propositions it takes as its fundamental mathematical object the abstract
algebra of operators whose Hermitian elements are identified with physical
observables.
A broad class of operational approaches focuses not primarily on the
structure of propositions or observables but on primitive laboratory oper-
ations such as preparations, reversible transformations and measurements.
Thereby particular emphasis is placed on the probability functionals, or
states, and their convex geometry; whence this sometimes goes under the
name convex set or convex cone approach. From the convex geometry
of the set of states and with the help of additional auxiliary assumptions
the full apparatus of quantum theory can be deduced. Major efforts in this
direction have been associated with Mackey [Mac63], the Marburg School
[Lud54, HK69, Kra83], Varadarajan [Var62, Var85], Gudder [Gud73, Gud88]
and others [DL70, Edw70, Ara80, d’A].
Branching off this broad current is the somewhat more recent test spaces
approach, promoted mainly by members of the Amherst School [FR72, RF73,
FR81, FGR92, FGR93, Wil00]. It is based on a generalised notion of sample
space and emphasises the status of quantum theory as one of many possible
generalised probability theories. Indeed, quantum theory can be regarded
as but a variant of classical probability theory: Like the latter it deals with
hypotheses (represented mathematically by subspaces of Hilbert space) and
their probabilities (expectation values of the associated projection operators),
with many important theorems of classical probability theory carrying over
to the quantum case. One example is the quantum analog of the de Finetti
representation for exchangeable sequences [CFS02b], which in turn is just a
special case of a more general result for test spaces [BL09].
Still within the wider context of operational approaches Hardy [Har01] re-
cently proposed to derive quantum theory from a simple set of “five reason-
able axioms”: (i) Probabilities are defined as limits of relative frequencies.
(ii) Probability distributions are specified by the minimal number of degrees
of freedom that is compatible with the other axioms. (iii) Systems of the
same information-carrying capacity exhibit the same structure, regardless of
whether they are isolated or the result of constraining some bigger system.
(iv) Upon combining constituents into a composite system, dimension and
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number of degrees of freedom are multiplicative. (v) Between any two pure
states there exists a continuous reversible transformation.
The advent of quantum computation [Ste98, NC00, Mer07] has led to
revived interest in, and cross-fertilisation with, foundational issues [Key02,
Fuc02, Bar02]. For instance, there have been efforts to distill those computa-
tional features that are genuinely quantum mechanical rather than generic to
a wider class of non-classical generalised probability theories [Bar07, BBLW06,
BBLW07, BBLW08]. With quantum theory opening the way to novel forms
of computation, some researchers have taken the next logical step to regard
quantum theory as nothing but a framework for (highly efficient) information
processing.2 Reconstructive approaches in this spirit include axiomatisations
on the basis of category theory [AC04, Har09] that take very much a com-
puter science perspective, or attempts at characterising quantum theory in
terms of purely information-theoretic constraints [CBH03].
Finally, quantum Bayesianism is the quantum version of the homony-
mous program in classical probability theory [SBC01, CFS02a, Sre05, Tim08].
In the Bayesian view probability theory constitutes an extension of logic
[BS00, Jay03]; it is but a consistent framework for plausible reasoning in the
face of uncertainty. Probabilities, and hence states, embody some agent’s
knowledge about, rather than an objective property of, a physical system;
they represent degrees of belief rather than limits of relative frequencies; and
they can be legitimately assigned not just to ensembles but also to individ-
ual systems. Bayesian probability emphasises (and makes explicit) the role of
prior knowledge as a key input on a par with measurement data. Probability
assigments are, however, not entirely at an agent’s discretion: They must sat-
isfy a number of consistency requirements which ensure that different ways
of using the same information lead to the same conclusions, irrespective of
the particular analysis path chosen. As shown for the classical case by Cox
[Cox46] these consistency requirements manifest themselves mathematically
in the sum and Bayes rules. In the quantum case these are supplemented
by additional coherence conditions [Fuc04]. There is also an alternative ap-
proach that applies Cox-style consistency requirements to amplitudes rather
than probabilities [Cat98, Cat00].
While each of the above approaches captures important aspects of quan-
2 This is reminiscent of Bohr’s philosophical remark that “physics is to be regarded
not so much as the study of something a priori given, but rather as the development of
methods for ordering and surveying human experience” [Boh63] (my italics).
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tum theory, most of them still fall short of singling out quantum theory
uniquely or are based on assumptions that call themselves for a more com-
pelling motivation. For instance, quantum logic does not specify the skew
field and cannot exclude the possibility of real [Stu60] or quaternionic [FJSS62]
Hilbert spaces. Moreover, Piron’s theorem holds only for Hilbert space di-
mension greater than three. The algebraic approach, though very powerful
mathematically, adds little to the conventional formulation of quantum the-
ory in terms of physical understanding. The convex geometry of the set
of states is too weak a constraint to rule out, e.g., generalisations of quan-
tum theory that are nonlinear [Mie74]; additional assumptions are needed.
For these additional assumptions there are various proposals which, how-
ever, have not yet settled on a universally agreed, easily comprehensible set
of axioms. For example, Hardy’s five axioms, though intuitively appealing,
resort to a questionable “simplicity” argument and make strong implicit as-
sumptions about the existence of a tensor product for composite systems.
Information-theoretic constraints can specify the mathematical apparatus of
quantum theory only if combined with further assumptions about its al-
gebraic structure. As for test spaces, it is not obvious how to single out
quantum theory from the multitude of possible generalised probability theo-
ries; there are indications, not yet proven, that such would require additional
assumptions regarding the symmetry, topology and composition properties
of quantum theory [Wil04, Wil05a, Wil05b, Wil]. And finally, the Bayesian
approach —when applied to probabilities— must invoke additional coher-
ence conditions for, e.g., symmetric informationally complete POVM that
are of a simple mathematical form but whose full physical meaning is yet to
be clarified [ADF07]; and when applied to amplitudes (in the form of Cox-
style consistency requirements) the question arises why one should start from
complex amplitudes in the first place.
In this paper I will not adhere to any specific of the above approaches;
nor do I wish to propose my own reconstructive scheme. Rather, my more
modest goal is to take a step back and have a fresh look at the commonalities
and differences between quantum and classical probability. The purpose of
such an analysis is threefold: to highlight in a comprehensive fashion the
(surprisingly many) features that quantum and classical probability have in
common; to distill the (few) properties that truly distinguish them; and in
light of the above, to explore the room there is, if any, for further probabilistic
theories other than classical or quantum theory. In doing so I will strive to
keep abstract mathematics to a minimum and instead emphasise as much as
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possible the physical meaning of the various properties. A large portion of my
paper will be dedicated to the first of the three objectives, as the full range of
commonalities of classical and quantum probability is not often exposed —
in contrast to their fundamental differences, which ever since the Einstein-
Bohr debate [EPR35, Boh35] have been scrutinised extensively. The key (and
novel) technical result, on the other hand, will pertain to the second objective:
I will show that the single distinguishing property of quantum theory is the
juxtaposition of finite information-carrying capacity and smoothness, where
the concept of smoothness will be carefully defined and motivated. The
mathematical derivation of this result will involve close inspection of the
symmetry group, with successive constraints leading unequivocally to the
unitary group of transformations in complex Hilbert space. As for the final
objective, I will provide arguments why there is likely no further probabilistic
theory that satisfies basic physical desiderata.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Sections 2.1 through 2.6 I will
identify six areas where classical and quantum theory have important features
in common: the logic of propositions, symmetry, probabilities, composition of
systems, state preparation and reductionism. While the two subsections on
the logic of propositions and on probabilities are fairly standard and largely
inspired by a mix of the existing quantum logic, convex cone and test spaces
approaches, the remaining parts of Section 2 are dedicated to areas that
are less often emphasised but in my opinion equally important for the full
picture. Next, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 I will single out joint decidability
and smoothness as the distinguishing properties of classical and quantum
probability, respectively. Smoothness in particular will turn out to be a
crucial concept, and I will dwell on its definition and physical meaning. In
Section 3.3 I will explore whether the commonalities identified in Section 2
may constitute an umbrella over not just classical and quantum probability
but also other probabilistic theories. The answer is in principle yes, but
the candidate theories will likely have no physical significance. Finally, in
Section 4 I will briefly venture outside the umbrella and consider more remote
alternatives that share with classical probability less structure than does
quantum theory; but I will quickly dismiss these on physical grounds. This
leads to the conjecture that quantum theory is in fact the only consistent
alternative to classical probability. I will conclude with a brief summary.
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Classical concept Quantum analog Generic name Symbol
Sample space Hilbert space Proposition system —
Subset Subspace Hypothesis, proposition a, b, x, y
Element 1-dim. subspace (ray) Most accurate hypothesis e, f
Empty set Zero Absurd hypothesis ∅
Disjointedness Orthogonality Contradiction, exclusion ⊥
Set inclusion Embedding Implication, refinement ⊆
Set complement Orthogonal complement Complement \
Cardinality Dimension Granularity d
Table 1: Correspondences between classical and quantum logical structure
and their generic representation.
2 Commonalities of classical and quantum
probability
2.1 Propositions
Classical and quantum theory share a common logical structure as sum-
marised in Table 1. This common structure is weaker than classical Aris-
totelian logic in that it lacks the Boolean “and” (∩) and “or” (∪) operations,
reflecting the fact that in the quantum case hypotheses need not be jointly
decidable. In this weaker structure any proposition a can be endowed with
a substructure (La := {x|x ⊆ a},⊆, \) isomorphic to an orthomodular poset
[Bir67], with orthocomplementation being defined relative to the maximal
element a.3
An alternative mathematical description uses instead the partial oper-
ation ⊕ corresponding classically to the union of disjoint sets, and in the
quantum case to the sum of mutually orthogonal subspaces. This partial
sum is symmetric and associative,
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x (1)
(x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = x⊕ y ⊕ z , (2)
3 In the quantum logic approach the “and” and “or” operations are defined nonetheless
as the intersection or closed hull of subspaces, respectively, endowing La with the richer
structure of a lattice rather than of a poset [Jau68]. However, I shall refrain from us-
ing these definitions as they violate the classical distributivity property and lack a clear
operational meaning.
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and has the absurd hypothesis as its unique neutral element
x = ∅ :⇔ x⊕ y = y ∀ y . (3)
By definition a partial sum exists if and only if the summands are mutually
contradictory; or conversely
x ⊥ y :⇔ ∃ x⊕ y . (4)
Logical implication of hypotheses can be defined via
x ⊆ a :⇔ ∃ a\x , (5)
where in turn a\x is the complement of x relative to a defined via
y = a\x :⇔ x⊕ y = a . (6)
The uniqueness of the relative complement renders (La,⊕) isomorphic to an
orthoalgebra [FR81, FGR92, Wil00] for any choice of maximal element a.
Whenever a (classical or quantum) hypothesis a is decomposed into mu-
tually exclusive, collectively exhaustive (MECE) refinements, and each of
these refinements into further MECE refinements, and so on in a tree-like
fashion until this iterative process comes to a halt because hypotheses can-
not be refined any further then regardless of the precise path chosen to arrive
at such a maximal decomposition the total number of outermost branches
equals the granularity
d(a) := max#{xi|
⊕
i
xi = a, xi 6= ∅} . (7)
It vanishes if and only if the proposition is absurd; is equal to one if and only
if the proposition is most accurate; and adds up under partial summation,
d(
⊕
i
xi) =
∑
i
d(xi) . (8)
Granularity is closely related to information-carrying capacity: Having ascer-
tained the truth of hypothesis a, the amount of additional information that
can be extracted by way of further, more refined measurements is bounded
from above —in both the classical and the quantum case— by log d(a). For
simplicity of argument I shall assume in the remainder of this paper that the
granularity of all propositions is finite.
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Associated with each hypothesis a are collections of ordered decomposi-
tions
Ma(k1, . . . , kr) := {(x1, . . . , xr)|
⊕
i
xi = a, d(xi) = ki} (9)
labelled by the granularity vector (k1, . . . , kr). These granularities must be
non-zero and sum to d(a). For different granularity vectors the associated
collections are mutually disjoint; while their union, over all ~k, contains all
possible ordered decompositions of a. Two special cases are the set of all
most accurate refinements of a,
Xa := {e|e ⊆ a} ∼ Ma(1, d(a)− 1) , (10)
and the collection of unordered maximal decompositions
Aa := {{ei}|
⊕
i
ei = a} ∼ Ma(1, . . . , 1)/Sd(a) (11)
which is isomorphic to its ordered counterpart modulo permutation of the
branches. The pair (Xa,Aa) constitutes a test space or “manual”, which in
the test spaces approach is taken as the basic structure on which a probability
theory is erected [Wil00].
In sum, the common logical structure underlying both classical and quan-
tum probability can be described in either of three equivalent ways: as a col-
lection of orthomodular posets, of orthoalgebras, or of test spaces. All these
mathematical structures can be associated to arbitrary maximal elements a.
In the following I shall limit myself to those cases where the granularity of
this maximal element is finite.
2.2 Symmetry
In both the classical and the quantum case the proposition system can be
characterised entirely by its symmetry. Let G be the group of all automor-
phisms that preserve the partial sum,
g(
⊕
i
xi) =
⊕
i
g(xi) , (12)
and hence the logical structure exhibited in Table 1; and Ga its subgroup
that leaves in addition the hypothesis a and all its implications invariant,
Ga := {g ∈ G|g(a⊕ x) = a⊕ x∀x} . (13)
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This subgroup also preserves all collectionsMa(k1, . . . , kr). Moreover in both
the classical and the quantum case it acts on these collections transitively,
rendering them homogeneous spaces
Ma(k1, . . . , kr) ∼ Ga/
r⊗
i=1
Gxi , (x1, . . . , xr) ∈Ma(k1, . . . , kr) . (14)
Collections that pertain to different hypotheses and different granular-
ity vectors are isomorphic whenever the granularity vectors agree up to a
permutation,
Ma(k1, . . . , kr) ∼Mb(l1, . . . , ls) ∀ {ki} = {lj} , (15)
and can thus be grouped into equivalence classes M({ki}) labelled by the
unordered set of granularities only. Likewise the subgroups pertaining to
different hypotheses fall into equivalence classes that have granularity as
their sole parameter. In effect all structure depends on granularity only,
not on any specifics of the proposition system under consideration.4 The
isomorphism (14) then carries over to an isomorphism of equivalence classes
M({ki}) ∼ G(
∑
i
ki)/
⊗
i
G(ki) , (16)
including as special cases
X(d) ∼ G(d)/(G(d− 1)⊗ G(1)) (17)
and
A(d) ∼ (G(d)/G(1)⊗d)/Sd . (18)
The pair (X,A) becomes a symmetric G-test space [Wil05a].
In the classical case G(d) is the symmetric (or permutation) group Sd;
whereas in the quantum case it is the unitary group U(d). Whether or not
other groups might be physically meaningful is a key issue addressed in this
paper.
4 That granularity is the sole structural parameter is reminiscent of a conjecture by
Fuchs [Fuc02] that the sole objective property of a quantum system is its Hilbert space
dimension.
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2.3 Probabilities
A state ρ assigns to hypotheses a probability between zero and one,
ρ : x→ prob(x|ρ) ∈ [0, 1] . (19)
Two states are identical if and only if they yield the same probabilities,
ρ = σ ⇔ prob(x|ρ) = prob(x|σ) ∀x , (20)
so specifying a state is tantamount to providing a complete list of all prob-
abilities.5 Classically any probability is given by a sum of elementary prob-
abilities
∑
e⊆x ρ(e) over the appropriate subset of sample space, whereas
in the quantum case it is given by the trace tr(ρPx) (Gleason’s theorem
[Gle57, Per95]). In both cases probabilities obey the sum rule
prob(
⊕
i
xi|ρ) =
∑
i
prob(xi|ρ) (21)
as well as the product rule
prob(x|ρ) = prob(x|x⊕ y, ρ) · prob(x⊕ y|ρ) , (22)
where the latter is weaker than the classical Bayes rule. Symmetry transfor-
mations of states are defined via the invariance requirement
prob(g(x)|g(ρ)) = prob(x|ρ) . (23)
When probabilities are conditional, the order of the conditions may be
relevant. The notation is such that conditions are to be read from right to
left: i.e., prob(x|yk, . . . , y2, y1, ρ) denotes the probability of x given that one
started from the prior ρ, then ascertained y1, subsequently y2, and so on.
If one of the conditions is a most accurate proposition then —by the very
definition of the term “most accurate”— it supersedes all previous conditions.
In particular, it supersedes any prior,
prob(x|e, ρ) = prob(x|e, σ) ≡ prob(x|e) ∀ ρ, σ , (24)
so that in the posterior probabilities the most accurate proposition effectively
plays the role of the new state. Such a state is termed “pure”.
5 This definition of the state is operational in the sense that experimental indistin-
guishability (same probabilities) implies mathematical identification (same states).
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Finally, in both the classical and the quantum case the set of states
exhibits one further important property: If {prob(x|ρ)} and {prob(x|σ)}
are two lists of probabilities corresponding to states ρ and σ, respectively,
then there exist states yielding any mixture {αprob(x|ρ)+βprob(x|σ)} with
α, β ∈ [0, 1] and α+β ≤ 1 (not necessarily equal to one as distributions need
not be normalised). States thus form a convex cone. In the homonymous ap-
proach to quantum reconstruction this geometrical property is taken as the
starting point from which, with the help of additional auxiliary assumptions,
the full apparatus of quantum theory is deduced. However, this will not be
the approach adopted here.
2.4 Composition
Whenever two hypotheses pertain to different physical systems A and B they
are jointly decidable6 and can hence be concatenated via the Boolean “and”
operation
× : xA, xB → xA × xB . (25)
Here the notation “×” rather than “∩” emphasises the fact that this Boolean
“and” is not defined in general but only for propositions relating to disparate
systems. Given this restriction, distributivity holds:
(
⊕
i
xAi )× (
⊕
j
yBj ) =
⊕
ij
xAi × yBj . (26)
And in both the classical and the quantum case joint probabilities satisfy the
product rule
prob(xA × yB|ρ) = prob(xA|yB, ρ) · prob(yB|ρ) . (27)
If eA and eB are most accurate hypotheses about A and B, respectively,
then eA × eB constitutes a most accurate hypothesis about the composite
A× B. This implies for the granularity the product rule
d(xA × yB) = d(xA) · d(xB) . (28)
Moreover, all propositions of the product form eA × eB are contained in the
set of most accurate propositions about the composite system A× B:
X(dAdB) ⊇ X(dA)×X(dB) . (29)
6 This implies a “no-signalling principle” [Bar07].
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In the classical case this is in fact an equality because all most accurate
propositions about a composite system have the product form. Consequently,
the classical cardinality #X(d) = d satisfies the product rule #X(dAdB) =
#X(dA) ·#X(dB). In contrast, in the quantum case there exist pure states
(and hence most accurate propositions) that are not separable, rendering
X(dAdB) strictly larger than the product X(dA)×X(dB). Indeed, this pos-
sibility of entanglement is reflected in the manifold dimension dimX(d) =
2(d−1) which for d ≥ 2 obeys the strict inequality dimX(dAdB) > dimX(dA)+
dimX(dB).
In a similar vein arbitrary concerted action of reversible operations on
different constituents yields an allowed reversible operation on the compos-
ite. In mathematical terms, if G is a finite group then the Cartesian product
of independent subsets of G(dA) and G(dB) must be isomorphic to an inde-
pendent subset of G(dAdB); or if G is continuous, the Cartesian product of
Lie generators of G(dA) and G(dB) must be isomorphic to a subset of the Lie
generators of G(dAdB). This entails the constraint
G
{
finite: µ′(G(dAdB)) ≥ µ′(G(dA)) · µ′(G(dB))
continuous: dimG(dAdB) ≥ dimG(dA) · dimG(dB) , (30)
where in the finite case µ′ denotes the size of the largest independent subset.
Indeed, for the classical symmetric group Sd it is µ
′(Sd) = d−1 [Whi00, CC02]
and hence the upper inequality is satisfied; while in the quantum case the
lower inequality is satisfied (and even saturated) by the unitary group U(d)
with dimU(d) = d2.
2.5 Preparation
All knowledge about a physical system, embodied in its state, results from a
series of experiments or “preparation procedures”. Let a denote the propo-
sition that the system under consideration exists at all, and σ its state prior
to a given procedure. Each preparation procedure is then an arbitrary com-
bination of (i) controlled reversible operations; (ii) measurements7 of MECE
refinements {xi} of a, ⊕i xi = a; and (iii) keeping or discarding (= setting a
7 In the quantum case the measurements considered here are assumed to be von Neu-
mann measurements rather than POVM. This does not limit the generality of the argu-
ment, as a POVM can always be understood as a von Neumann measurement on some
larger system (Neumark’s theorem [Neu40, Per95]).
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to “false”) the system, with respective probabilities that may depend both on
the prior and on the outcome of the measurement. As an example consider a
photon (so the hypothesis a: “the photon exists” is true) whose polarisation
is first (i) rotated, then (ii) measured along some axis with possible outcomes
{x1, x2}, ⊕i xi = a, and (iii) allowed to pass if and only if the outcome is x1,
and else discarded (hence a set to “false”). These three steps may or may
not take place inside a black box hiding the measurement outcome from the
observer, and there may be a finite probability of error. The net effect on
probabilities is then of the general form
prob(y|σ) → ∑
i
λi(g(σ)) · prob(y|xi, g(σ)) ≡ prob(y|ρ) , (31)
g being the reversible operation and {λi} the respective probabilities (modulo
normalisation) with which the system is kept, given the rotated prior and
measurement outcome xi. The updated probabilities correspond to some
posterior ρ. In the special case where the prior is pure (σ = e) and only a
single outcome x is selected, this posterior remains pure (ρ = f):
∀ e, x6⊥e ∃ f : prob(y|x, e) = prob(y|f) ∀ y . (32)
The procedure described above can be iterated, with the posterior ρ serving
as the new prior for the next iteration, until preparation is completed. In
both the classical and the quantum case all states can be prepared in this
way.
An arbitrary probability distribution on the substructure of a, i.e., the
list of all probabilities {prob(x|ρ)|x ⊆ a}, is completely specified by a finite
number of real parameters. (One of these parameters is prob(a|ρ) which need
not be normalised to one.) Like the substructure itself the number of param-
eters depends on the granularity d of a only and shall be denoted by S(d).
Since every distribution results from preparation procedures as described
above, an alternative way to specify it is by (i) the set {xi} ∈ M({ki}),∑
i ki = d, that was last subjected to measurement, requiring dimM({ki})
parameters; and (ii) associated with each possible outcome xi, the posterior
λi(g(σ)) · prob(y|xi, g(σ)) on the substructure of xi, requiring S(ki) param-
eters.8 This way of characterising the distribution requires the same total
8 This presupposes non-contextuality insofar as the posterior on the substructure of xi
and hence the number of parameters S(ki) do not depend on whichever set of propositions
{xj}j 6=i was measured alongside xi.
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number of parameters, so
S(
∑
i
ki) = dimM({ki}) +
∑
i
S(ki) . (33)
Indeed, this condition is satisfied in both the classical and the quantum
case. Classically the set M({ki}) is discrete, whence dimM({ki}) = 0 and
S(d) = d; whereas in the quantum caseM({ki}) is a continuous manifold of
dimension 2
∑
i<j kikj, and S(d) = d
2.
2.6 Reductionism
Let aA, aB be hypotheses that pertain to two distinct physical systems A and
B. Probability distributions on their substructures are specified by S(dA)
and S(dB) real parameters, respectively. Therefore any distribution on one
of the substructures can be characterised completely by the probabilities
of just some finite set of —not necessarily mutually exclusive— hypotheses
{bAi ⊆ aA}S(dA)i=1 or {bBj ⊆ aB}S(dB)j=1 , respectively.
Suppose that one knows the S(dA) · S(dB) probabilities of the combined
hypotheses {bAi × bBj }. Then these probabilities suffice to specify not only
the two single-constituent distributions but also all constituent-constituent
correlations. This can be seen as follows. First, without loss of generality
the hypotheses {b} (for either system) can be chosen such that some subset
of these, {bi}i∈I , I ⊆ {1 . . . S(d)} constitutes a MECE decomposition of
a,
⊕
i∈I bi = a. Then distributivity (26) and the sum rule (21) give all
probabilities
prob(aA × bBj |ρ) =
∑
i∈IA
prob(bAi × bBj |ρ) . (34)
Next, application of the product rule (22) yields all
prob(bAi |aA × bBj , ρ) = prob(bAi × bBj |ρ)/prob(aA × bBj |ρ) (35)
which, as the {bAi } are informationally complete, implies in fact knowledge
of prob(xA|aA × bBj , ρ) for any xA ⊆ aA. By yet another application of the
product rule (22) one obtains any
prob(xA × bBj |ρ) = prob(xA|aA × bBj , ρ) · prob(aA × bBj |ρ) (36)
as well as, via distributivity and sum rule, prob(xA × aB|ρ). These in turn
yield
prob(bBj |xA × aB, ρ) = prob(xA × bBj |ρ)/prob(xA × aB|ρ) (37)
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and thus, {bBj } being informationally complete, any prob(yB|xA × aB, ρ).
Finally, applying the product rule (22) one last time gives
prob(xA × yB|ρ) = prob(yB|xA × aB, ρ) · prob(xA × aB|ρ) (38)
for any xA ⊆ aA, yB ⊆ aB, and hence indeed the complete statistics of both
systems including their correlations.
In a reductionist theory the properties of a composite system are deter-
mined entirely by those of its constituents and their statistical correlations.
Beyond these there are no genuinely “holistic” properties of the composite
system. So knowing the probabilities of xA × yB for any xA ⊆ aA, yB ⊆ aB
is tantamount to knowing the global state of the composite system.9 The
S(dA) · S(dB) parameters that suffice to specify the former, therefore, also
suffice to specify the latter:
S(dAdB) ≤ S(dA) · S(dB) . (39)
This inequality need not necessarily be saturated, as the effective number of
degrees of freedom of the composite system might be reduced by constraints
on the correlations that are allowed between subsystems. Classical probabil-
ity and quantum theory are both reductionist without such constraints, and
hence not only satisfy but also saturate the above inequality.
Reductionism is a key prerequisite for the ability to subject probabilistic
models to experimental tests, and hence ultimately for the success of the
scientific method. In the modern Bayesian view probabilities have a priori
nothing to do with measurable relative frequencies, a distinction which is
particularly apparent in those cases where probabilities pertain to isolated
events that cannot be repeated or —as is the case in quantum theory— to
individual systems that cannot be subjected to measurements without distur-
bance [Har68]. Yet whenever probabilities pertain to multi-partite sequences
that are exchangeable (or more Bayesian: whose exchangeability is agreed
upon by a group of agents) then it is possible to collect frequency data, and
this data drives agents via Bayes rule towards a unique posterior distribu-
tion regardless of their initial, invariably subjective beliefs. This possibility
to reach a consensus through the collection of data is a fundamental assump-
tion underlying any empirical science; in particular, it is implicit whenever
9 This is also known as the “global state assumption” [Bar07] or “local observability
principle” [d’A].
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one speaks of “the” state of a system as being the result of some well-defined
preparation procedure [Per95, CFS07].10 But such convergence to a consen-
sus is not self-evident: It rests on the existence of a de Finetti representation
for exchangeable sequences, which in turn is guaranteed only in probabilistic
theories that are reductionist [CFS02b].
3 Additional requirements needed to derive
specific cases
3.1 Classical case: Joint decidability
In addition to the shared features discussed in Section 2 classical probability
theory makes one more basic assumption: that all hypotheses be jointly
decidable. Two hypotheses a and b are jointly decidable (denoted a ↔ b) if
and only if they have a joint decomposition ⊕xi,
a↔ b :⇔ ∃⊕
i∈I
xi : a =
⊕
j∈Ia⊆I
xj , b =
⊕
k∈Ib⊆I
xk . (40)
Under this assumption one can define the Boolean operations “and” (∩),
“or” (∪) for arbitrary propositions via
a ∩ b := ⊕
i∈Ia∩Ib
xi , a ∪ b :=
⊕
i∈Ia∪Ib
xi (41)
which satisfy the classical distributivity properties
a ∩⊕
j
bj =
⊕
j
(a ∩ bj) , a ∩
⋃
j
bj =
⋃
j
(a ∩ bj) . (42)
The product rule (22) then implies the classical Bayes rule
prob(a ∩ b|ρ) = prob(a|b, ρ) · prob(b|ρ) (43)
10 Consensus-building may fail, however, if agents do not share the same belief about
basic symmetries such as a sequence’s exchangeability, and hence start from priors that
differ not just in parameter values but also in their parametric form. It may also fail if for
the parameter values agents assign priors that are so different from each other that they do
not have any overlap. Under such conditions even an infinite amount of measurement data
may lead to vastly different conclusions [FS09]. Strictly speaking, therefore, the state of a
system is never truly objective. Rather, it constitutes an intersubjective consensus among
a group of agents who started from some common set of minimal symmetry assumptions
and possibly diverse, yet overlapping priors.
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on which, together with the sum rule (21), the whole edifice of classical
probability theory can be erected [Siv96, Jay03].
3.2 Quantum case: Smoothness
The distinguishing feature of quantum theory is its peculiar smoothness.11
Despite the limitation that accessible information be finite, quantum theory
deals only with continua: The set of hypotheses about a system, the symme-
try group and all probability distributions are continuous. In mathematical
terms, while the information-carrying capacity and hence the granularity d
are constrained to be finite the set of most accurate hypotheses X(d) forms a
continuous manifold (for d ≥ 2) of dimension dimX(d) > 0, the simplest ex-
ample being for qubits (d = 2) the surface of the Bloch sphere; this manifold
is compact [Fiv94]. Correspondingly, the symmetry group G(d) is a compact
Lie group. And the continuity of probability distributions manifests itself in
the property that given any a and e0 ∈ Xa,
∀ ǫ > 0 , a ⊇ x ⊇ e0 ∃ δ > 0 : prob(x|e) > 1− ǫ ∀ e ∈ Ba(e0; δ) (44)
where Ba(e0; δ) is an open ball (in the group-induced topology) in Xa around
e0; i.e., probabilities which are initially equal to one do not suddenly jump
to a lower value upon an infinitesimal transformation. I shall show that
this continuity requirement alone, in combination with the commonalities
discussed in Section 2, constrains G(d) to be the unitary group U(d) and
hence singles out the quantum case.
Before embarking on a proof of this assertion I shall elaborate briefly on
the physical meaning of the continuity requirement. Continuity ensures that
probability assignments are robust under small preparation inaccuracies, in
a sense which I shall discuss further below. Moreover, continuity turns out
to be linked to the quantum Zeno or “watched pot” effect.12 To see this, I
first note that being a compact Lie group, G(d) is endowed with a positive
definite invariant metric [BR86]. In this metric let G(d; δ) denote an open
11 There is sometimes the seemingly opposite claim that a characteristic feature of
quantum theory is the “discontinuity” of state change upon an act of measurement. Yet
in a Bayesian approach such discontinuous changes occur in classical probability theory,
too, and simply reflect the process of learning.
12 That quantum theory somehow resolves the tension between discreteness and conti-
nuity, and that there may be a link to the Zeno paradox, has been alluded to by Deutsch
[Deu04].
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ball of radius δ around the identity. Continuity then implies that, given any
e ∈ X(d),
∀ ǫ > 0 ∃ δ > 0 : prob(e|g(e)) > 1− ǫ ∀ g ∈ G(d; δ) . (45)
Define δ(ǫ) as the radius which saturates the continuity condition,
δ(ǫ) := sup{δ|prob(e|g(e)) > 1− ǫ ∀ g ∈ G(d; δ)} . (46)
Due to symmetry this radius depends on ǫ only, not on the specific hypothesis
e or granularity d. Then for N replicas
inf
{
N∏
i=1
prob(e|gi(e))
∣∣∣∣∣ gi ∈ G(d; δ(ǫ))
}
= (1− ǫ)N ≈ 1−Nǫ , (47)
where the approximation holds whenever ǫ is sufficiently small. By com-
position rule (27) the N -fold product of probabilities can also be written
as
N∏
i=1
prob(e|gi(e)) = prob(e×N |g(e×N)) (48)
with shorthand e×N ≡ e× . . .×e and some N -partite transformation g taken
from the tensor product of open balls G(d; δ(ǫ))⊗N . This tensor product is
in turn contained in some open ball in the symmetry group G(dN) of the
composite system. The minimal radius of the latter follows from the law of
Pythagoras for the group metric; it equals
√
Nδ(ǫ). The infimum (47) thus
translates into
inf
{
prob(e×N |g(e×N))
∣∣∣ g ∈ G(dN ;√Nδ(ǫ))} = (1− ǫ)N ≈ 1−Nǫ , (49)
yielding for sufficiently small ǫ the scaling property
δ(Nǫ) ≈
√
Nδ(ǫ) . (50)
This scaling implies
prob(e×N |g1(e)× . . .× gN(e)) ≥ 1− ǫ ∀ gi ∈ G(d; δ(ǫ)/
√
N) , (51)
which can be interpreted as follows: Given a sequence of N independent and
—to within some finite accuracy— identically prepared systems, the com-
posite proposition e×N is confirmed with asymptotic probability O(1), i.e.,
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larger than an arbitrary threshold 1− ǫ (0 < ǫ < 1) that does not depend on
N , if and only if the constituents were prepared in the pure state e to within
an accuracy O(1/
√
N). In short, continuity ensures that the probabilistic
model tolerates finite preparation inaccuracies of the order O(1/
√
N).
A second, related consequence of the scaling property (50) is
lim
N→∞
N∏
i=1
prob(e|gi(e)) = 1 ∀ gi ∈ G(d; δ/N) (52)
for arbitrary finite d and δ, a result which is tantamount to the quantum
Zeno effect [MS77]: When the transformation of a pure state e over a finite
distance δ on the group manifold is cut into N steps of equal length, each
followed by a measurement of the original proposition e, then as N →∞ the
net effect is that the system remains trapped in its original state.
I now prove my original assertion that the continuity requirement leads
uniquely to quantum theory in complex Hilbert space. In order to understand
the implications of the continuity requirement for the group G(d) I return
to its original formulation (44). By preparation rule (32), for each e in the
open ball Ba(e0; δ) there exists a unique most accurate hypothesis f such
that prob(f |x, e) = 1; or equivalently,
∀ e ∈ Ba(e0; δ) , a ⊇ x ⊇ e0 ∃! f : prob(x\f |x, e) = 0 . (53)
The product rule (22) then implies that also
prob(x\f |e) = prob(x\f |x, e) · prob(x|e) = 0 , (54)
so e ⊥ x\f and hence
e ⊆ a\(x\f) =: y . (55)
This allows that the overarching hypothesis a can be decomposed in three
different ways:
e⊕ (a\e) = e⊕ (y\e)⊕ (x\f) = f ⊕ (x\f)⊕ (a\x) . (56)
Given a and x, and hence a\x, one can now specify e in two equivalent ways:
(i) directly as e ∈ Ba(e0; δ); or (ii) as e ∈ Xy, where in turn y must be
specified via f ∈ Xx. In both cases the total number of parameters needed
must be the same:
dimX(d) = dimX(d− l + 1) + dimX(l) , (57)
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where d = d(a) and l = d(x). By induction with initial condition dimX(1) =
dimX(0) = 0,
dimX(d) = dimX(2) · (d− 1) . (58)
The isomorphism (17) together with initial condition dimG(0) = 0 then
constrain the Lie group dimension to be of the quadratic form
dimG(d) = dimX(2)
2
d(d− 1) + dimG(1) · d ; (59)
and for the number of parameters S(d) the dimensional relation (33) together
with the initial conditions S(0) = 0 and S(1) = 1 yield the similar form
S(d) =
dimX(2)
2
d(d− 1) + d . (60)
The constraint (30) on group composition (continuous case) on the one
hand, and reductionism (39) on the other, allow in fact only a single non-
zero value for dimX(2), namely dimX(2) = 2, and only the two values 0
and 1 for dimG(1). These parameter values correspond to the compact Lie
groups O(d)⊗O(d) and U(d), respectively. Moreover, convexity of the set of
states presupposes that X(d) be the hull of a convex set. Yet for d = 2 the
group O(2)⊗O(2) yields X(2) ∼ S1×S1 isomorphic to a torus, which is not
simply connected and hence not the hull of a convex set; similar problems
arise with O(d) ⊗ O(d) in higher dimensions. Therefore, when combined
with the properties discussed in Section 2, the continuity requirement leaves
indeed only the unitary group U(d) as a permitted symmetry and so leads
unambiguously to quantum theory in complex Hilbert space.
3.3 Further cases?
If neither joint decidability nor smoothness are required then it is conceivable
that the commonalities discussed in Section 2 allow for additional cases.
However, I shall argue that the set of possible alternatives to classical or
quantum probability is severely limited and likely unphysical.
The isomorphism (16), composition constraint (30), preparation rule (33)
and reductionism (39), as well as the initial conditions dimG(0) = 0, S(0) = 0
and S(1) = 1 constrain the number of degrees of freedom to obey a power
law
S(d) = dµ (61)
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and the dimension of the group manifold to be of the form
dimG(d) = dµ + (dimG(1)− 1) · d (62)
with some positive integer µ > 0 and dimG(1) ∈ {0, 1}. The case µ =
1, dimG(1) = 0 encompasses the classical case G(d) = Sd but might in prin-
ciple also accomodate finite groups other than the symmetric group; such
alternative finite groups might correspond to “constrained” versions of clas-
sical probability theory. The case µ = 1, dimG(1) = 1 yields the same
classical sample space but allows for a phase to be attached to each most
accurate hypothesis, with associated symmetry group G(d) = U(1)⊗d; this
“semi-classical” case may be worth exploring further. The case µ = 2 corre-
sponds to the quantum case discussed in Section 3.2 with symmetry group
G(d) = U(d), possibly modulo some finite factor group.
As genuine non-classical alternatives, therefore, there remain only prob-
abilistic theories of higher order µ ≥ 3, a possibility already pointed out by
Hardy [Har01]. However, the central result of Section 3.2 implies that such
a higher-order theory would necessarily exhibit some form of discontinuity.
Moreover, it appears difficult to imagine the physical meaning of an associ-
ated Lie group such as, say, U(d2) that would be needed to yield the required
dimensionalities. There is of course the possibility that the symmetry group
is exceptional or even non-topological; yet the physical meaning of such an
exotic scenario would be even more elusive. In sum, as long as the features
discussed in Section 2 are required to hold, there appears to be no reasonable
alternative to classical or quantum probability.
4 Discussion
The commonalities of classical and quantum probability extend farther than
one might at first expect. As discussed in Section 2, classical and quantum
theory share a substantial number of features regarding the logic of proposi-
tions, symmetry, probabilities, composition of systems, state preparation and
reductionism. Only at a late stage do their ways part, with the requirement
of joint decidability leading to classical theory, whereas demanding smooth-
ness leads to quantum theory. The essence of quantum theory, therefore,
is the juxtaposition of finite information-carrying capacity and smoothness:
the fact that even though information-carrying capacity is finite, quantum
theory describes systems that are continuous (i.e., subject to a continuum of
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hypotheses); or conversely, that even for continuous systems the information-
carrying capacity remains finite. The step from classical to quantum proba-
bility thus amounts to—given finite information-carrying capacity— forgoing
joint decidability in favor of smoothness; or given smoothness, relinquishing
joint decidability in favor of a finite information-carrying capacity.13
While from the above perspective the step from classical to quantum
probability may now seem rather small, it entails the following well known,
far-reaching consequences:
1. Indeterminism. Quantum theory exhibits an irreducible probabilism
in the sense that in every state, even if pure, there are always hypotheses
whose probabilities are neither 0 nor 1. Mathematically, this manifests
itself in non-commutativity and uncertainty relations.
2. Non-separability. The whole is more than the sum of its parts; it may
be in a pure state that is not a product of constituent states. In contrast
to classical separability, the whole can in general not be dissected into
parts without a resulting loss of information. Mathematically, this
manifests itself in the possibility of entanglement.14
3. Observer-dependency. Measurement implies disturbance. The im-
age of reality that emerges through acts of measurement reflects as
much the history of intervention as it reflects the external world; there
is no preexisting reality that is merely revealed, rather than influenced,
by the act of measurement.15 Mathematically, this is encapsulated in
the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems [Mer93].
Besides quantum theory there appear to be no other meaningful alter-
natives to classical probability theory. I argued in Section 3.3 that if taken
as constraints, the commonalities identified in Section 2 leave little room
for cases other than classical or quantum probability. Of course, those con-
straints might be relaxed: At least formally there may exist non-classical
13 For the purposes of this article I ignore limiting cases where the Hilbert space dimen-
sion, and hence information-carrying capacity, may be countably infinite.
14 This property of quantum mechanics is sometimes interpreted as a peculiar “holism”
which, however, I find misleading because such terminology suggests a contradiction to
the reductionism discussed in Section 2.6.
15 An entertaining, albeit loose metaphor for such an innate observer-dependency is
Wheeler’s modified version of the “game of 20 questions” [Whe83].
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theories that share less structure with classical probability than does quan-
tum theory, and that hence may lack some of the features discussed in Section
2. One example is quantum theory in real Hilbert space [Stu60]. There the
symmetry group is the orthogonal group O(d), and states are specified by
S(d) = d(d + 1)/2 parameters. Real quantum theory shares with classical
probability the first five of the six commonalities discussed in Section 2. But
it is not reductionist: Already for a system composed of two real qubits it is
S(4) > S(2) ·S(2) in violation of Eq. (39); there may be “holistic” properties
of a two-qubit system that cannot be understood in terms of the constituent
qubits and their correlations alone. As a consequence there is in general no de
Finetti representation for exchangeable sequences, which deprives real quan-
tum theory of a crucial link between probabilities and measurable frequencies
[CFS02b].
Another non-classical alternative could be quantum theory in quater-
nionic Hilbert space [FJSS62]. Its symmetry group is the symplectic group
Sp(d) with group dimension d(2d+1). States are specified by S(d) = d(2d−1)
parameters, yielding for two quaternionic qubits the strict inequality S(4) <
S(2) · S(2). This is compatible with reductionism, yet shows that there are
constraints on the allowed correlations between subsystems. All exchange-
able sequences have a de Finetti representation but the converse is no longer
true: Not all distributions of the de Finetti form represent allowed states
[CFS02b]. The main drawback of quaternionic quantum theory, however,
is the fact that it no longer allows the arbitrary composition of reversible
operations. Already for a system composed of two quaternionic qubits it
is dimG(4) < dimG(2) · dimG(2) in violation of the composition constraint
(30).
The above examples strongly suggest that there is in fact no consistent
alternative to quantum theory as we know it: Any non-classical probability
theory other than quantum theory in complex Hilbert space likely violates
basic physical desiderata. Future work will be aimed at further corroborating
this conjecture. If this effort is successful then the commonalities exhibited
in Section 2 combined with the smoothness requirement of Section 3.2 may
provide the basis for a novel reconstruction scheme for quantum theory.
Beyond the further development of reconstruction schemes it is my hope
that the results of my investigation may also inform future efforts in other
directions: e.g., the formulation of overarching frameworks for probability
theory that encompass both classical and quantum probability as special
cases; the generic definition of notions such as entropy or information without
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reference to any specific classical, quantum or other representation; or a
deeper conceptual understanding of the essential features of quantum theory
that make the genuine difference from classical probability.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Chris Fuchs, Lucien Hardy, Robert Spekkens and
Cozmin Ududec for their hospitality and stimulating discussions during a
visit to Perimeter Institute. I also thank Alex Wilce and Matt Leifer for
helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper.
25
References
[AC04] S. Abramsky and B. Coecke. A categorical semantics of quantum
protocols. In Proc. 19th IEEE Conference on Logic in Computer
Science, pages 415–425. IEEE Computer Science Press, 2004.
[ADF07] D. M. Appleby, H. B. Dang, and C. A. Fuchs. Physical sig-
nificance of symmetric informationally-complete sets of quantum
states. arXiv:0707.2071v1, 2007.
[AR05] Y. Aharonov and D. Rohrlich. Quantum Paradoxes: Quantum
Theory for the Perplexed. Wiley-VCH, 2005.
[Ara80] H. Araki. On a characterization of the state space of quantum
mechanics. Comm. Math. Phys., 75:1, 1980.
[Bal91] R. Balian. From Microphysics to Macrophysics, volume I.
Springer, 1991.
[Bal92] R. Balian. From Microphysics to Macrophysics, volume II.
Springer, 1992.
[Bar02] H. Barnum. Quantum information processing and quantum logic:
toward mutual illumination. arXiv:quant-ph/0205129v1, 2002.
[Bar07] J. Barrett. Information processing in generalized probabilistic
theories. Phys. Rev. A, 75:032304, 2007.
[BBLW06] H. Barnum, J. Barrett, M. Leifer, and A. Wilce. Cloning
and broadcasting in generic probabilistic theories. arXiv:quant-
ph/0611295v1, 2006.
[BBLW07] H. Barnum, J. Barrett, M. Leifer, and A. Wilce. Generalized
no-broadcasting theorem. Phys. Rev. Lett., 99:240501, 2007.
[BBLW08] H. Barnum, J. Barrett, M. Leifer, and A. Wilce. Teleportation
in general probabilistic theories. arXiv:0805.3553v1, 2008.
[BCF+94] H. Barnum, C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, R. Schack, D. J. Driebe,
W. G. Hoover, H. Posch, B. L. Holian, R. Peierls, and J. L.
Lebowitz. Is Boltzmann entropy time’s arrow’s archer? Phys.
Today, 47:11, November 1994.
26
[Bel04] J. S. Bell. Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics.
Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2004.
[Bir67] G. Birkhoff. Lattice Theory, volume 25 of Colloquium Publica-
tions. American Mathematical Society, 3rd edition, 1967.
[BL09] J. Barrett and M. Leifer. The de Finetti theorem for test spaces.
New J. Phys., 11:033024, 2009.
[Boh35] N. Bohr. Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality
be considered complete? Phys. Rev., 48:696, 1935.
[Boh63] N. Bohr. Essays 1958-1962 on atomic physics and human knowl-
edge. Wiley, 1963.
[BR86] A. O. Barut and R. Raczka. Theory of group representations and
applications. World Scientific, 2nd edition, 1986.
[BS00] J. M. Bernardo and A. F. M. Smith. Bayesian Theory. Wiley,
2000.
[BvN36] G. Birkhoff and J. v. Neumann. The logic of quantum mechanics.
Ann. Math., 37:823, 1936.
[Cat98] A. Caticha. Consistency, amplitudes and probabilities in quan-
tum theory. Phys. Rev. A, 57:1572, 1998.
[Cat00] A. Caticha. Insufficient reason and entropy in quantum theory.
Found. Phys., 30:227, 2000.
[CBH03] R. Clifton, J. Bub, and H. Halvorson. Characterizing quan-
tum theory in terms of information-theoretic constraints. Found.
Phys., 33:1561, 2003.
[CC02] P. J. Cameron and P. Cara. Independent generating sets and
geometries for symmetric groups. J. Algebra, 258:641, 2002.
[CFS02a] C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack. Quantum probabilities
as Bayesian probabilities. Phys. Rev. A, 65:022305, 2002.
[CFS02b] C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack. Unknown quantum
states: The quantum de Finetti representation. J. Math. Phys.,
43:4537, 2002.
27
[CFS07] C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack. Subjective probability
and quantum certainty. Studies Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys., 38:255,
2007.
[Cox46] R. T. Cox. Probability, frequency and reasonable expectation.
Am. J. Phys., 14:1, 1946.
[d’A] G. M. d’Ariano. Probabilistic theories: What is special about
quantum mechanics? In A. Bokulich and G. Jaeger, editors, Phi-
losophy of Quantum Information and Entanglement. Cambridge
University Press, to appear.
[Deu04] D. Deutsch. It from qubit. In J. Barrow, P. Davies, and C. Harper,
editors, Science and Ultimate Reality, pages 90–102. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[DL70] E. B. Davies and J. T. Lewis. An operational approach to quan-
tum probability. Comm. Math. Phys., 17:239, 1970.
[Edw70] C. M. Edwards. The operational approach to algebraic quantum
theory I. Comm. Math. Phys., 16:207, 1970.
[EPR35] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen. Can quantum-
mechanical description of physical reality be considered com-
plete? Phys. Rev., 47:777, 1935.
[FGR92] D. J. Foulis, R. J. Greechie, and G. T. Ru¨ttimann. Filters and
supports in orthoalgebras. Int. J. Theor. Phys., 31:789, 1992.
[FGR93] D. J. Foulis, R. J. Greechie, and G. T. Ru¨ttimann. Logicoalge-
braic structures II: Supports in test spaces. Int. J. Theor. Phys.,
32:1675, 1993.
[Fiv94] D. I. Fivel. How interference effects in mixtures determine the
rules of quantum mechanics. Phys. Rev. A, 50:2108, 1994.
[FJSS62] D. Finkelstein, J. M. Jauch, S. Schiminovich, and D. Speiser.
Foundations of quaternion quantum mechanics. J. Math. Phys.,
3:207, 1962.
[FR72] D. J. Foulis and C. H. Randall. Operational statistics I: Basic
concepts. J. Math. Phys., 13:1667, 1972.
28
[FR81] D. J. Foulis and C. H. Randall. What are quantum logics and
what ought they to be? In E. G. Beltrametti and B. C. van
Fraassen, editors, Current Issues in Quantum Logic, volume 8 of
Ettore Majorana International Science, Physical Sciences, pages
35–52. Plenum Press, 1981.
[FS09] C. A. Fuchs and R. Schack. Priors in quantum Bayesian infer-
ence. In L. Accardi, G. Adenier, A. Y. Khrennikov, C. A. Fuchs,
G. Jaeger, J.-A. Larsson, and S. Stenholm, editors, Foundations
of Probability and Physics - 5, volume 1101 of AIP Conference
Proceedings, pages 255–259. Springer, 2009.
[Fuc02] C. A. Fuchs. Quantum mechanics as quantum information (and
only a little more). arXiv:quant-ph/0205039v1, 2002.
[Fuc04] C. A. Fuchs. On the quantumness of a Hilbert space. Quant. Inf.
Comp., 4:467, 2004.
[Gle57] A. M. Gleason. Measures on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert
space. J. Math. Mech., 6:885, 1957.
[GN43] I. M. Gelfand and M. A. Neumark. On the embedding of normed
rings into the ring of operators in Hilbert space. Mat. Sb., 12:197,
1943.
[Gud73] S. Gudder. Convex structures and operational quantum mechan-
ics. Comm. Math. Phys., 29:249, 1973.
[Gud88] S. Gudder. Quantum probability. Academic Press, 1988.
[Haa92] R. Haag. Local quantum physics: fields, particles, algebras.
Springer, 1992.
[Har68] J. B. Hartle. Quantum mechanics of individual systems. Am. J.
Phys., 36:704, 1968.
[Har01] L. Hardy. Quantum theory from five reasonable axioms.
arXiv:quant-ph/0101012v4, 2001.
[Har09] J. Harding. A link between quantum logic and categorical quan-
tum mechanics. Int. J. Theor. Phys., 48:769, 2009.
29
[HK64] R. Haag and D. Kastler. An algebraic approach to quantum field
theory. J. Math. Phys., 5:848, 1964.
[HK69] K. E. Hellwig and K. Kraus. Pure operations and measurements.
Comm. Math. Phys., 11:214, 1969.
[HvNN28] D. HiIbert, J. v. Neumann, and L. Nordheim. U¨ber die
Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Math. Ann., 98:1, 1928.
[Jau68] J. M. Jauch. Foundations of quantum mechanics. Addison-
Wesley, 1968.
[Jay78] E. T. Jaynes. Where do we stand on maximum entropy? In R. D.
Levine and M. Tribus, editors, The Maximum Entropy Formal-
ism, pages 15–118. MIT Press, 1978.
[Jay89] E. T. Jaynes. Papers on probability, statistics and statistical
physics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. edited by R. D.
Rosenkrantz.
[Jay03] E. T. Jaynes. Probability theory: the logic of science. Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
[JvNW34] P. Jordan, J. v. Neumann, and E. Wigner. On an algebraic gen-
eralization of the quantum mechanical formalism. Ann. Math.,
35:29, 1934.
[Key02] M. Keyl. Fundamentals of quantum information theory. Phys.
Rep., 369:431, 2002.
[Kra83] K. Kraus. States, effects and operations: Fundamental notions
of quantum theory, volume 190 of Lecture Notes in Physics.
Springer, 1983.
[Leb93] J. L. Lebowitz. Boltzmann’s entropy and time’s arrow. Phys.
Today, 46:32, September 1993.
[Lud54] G. Ludwig. Die Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Springer,
1954.
[Mac63] G. Mackey. The mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics.
Benjamin, 1963.
30
[Mer93] N. D. Mermin. Hidden variables and the two theorems of
John Bell. Rev. Mod. Phys., 65:803, 1993.
[Mer07] N. D. Mermin. Quantum Computer Science. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2007.
[Mie74] B. Mielnik. Generalized quantum mechanics. Comm. Math.
Phys., 37:221, 1974.
[MS77] B. Misra and E. C. G. Sudarshan. The Zeno’s paradox in quantum
theory. J. Math. Phys., 18:756, 1977.
[NC00] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang. Quantum computation and quan-
tum information. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[Neu40] M. A. Neumark. Spectral functions of a symmetric operator. Izv.
Akad. Nauk SSSR Ser. Mat., 4:277, 1940.
[Per95] A. Peres. Quantum theory: concepts and methods. Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1995.
[Pir64] C. Piron. Axiomatique quantique. Helv. Phys. Acta, 37:439, 1964.
[Pir76] C. Piron. Foundations of quantum physics. Benjamin, 1976.
[RF73] C. H. Randall and D. J. Foulis. Operational statistics II: Manuals
of operations and their logics. J. Math. Phys., 14:1472, 1973.
[RM96] J. Rau and B. Mu¨ller. From reversible quantum microdynamics
to irreversible quantum transport. Phys. Rep., 272:1, 1996.
[SBC01] R. Schack, T. A. Brun, and C. M. Caves. Quantum Bayes rule.
Phys. Rev. A, 64:014305, 2001.
[Seg47] I. E. Segal. Postulates for general quantum mechanics. Ann.
Math., 48:930, 1947.
[Siv96] D. S. Sivia. Data analysis: a Bayesian tutorial. Oxford University
Press, 1996.
[Sre05] M. Srednicki. Subjective and objective probabilities in quantum
mechanics. Phys. Rev. A, 71:052107, 2005.
31
[Ste98] A. Steane. Quantum computing. Rept. Prog. Phys., 61:117, 1998.
[Stu60] E. C. G. Stueckelberg. Quantum theory in real Hilbert space.
Helv. Phys. Acta, 33:727, 1960.
[Thi81] W. Thirring. A course in mathematical physics 3: Quantum me-
chanics of atoms and molecules. Springer, 1981.
[Tim08] C. G. Timpson. Quantum Bayesianism: A study. Studies Hist.
Phil. Mod. Phys., 39:579, 2008.
[TW01] M. Tegmark and J. A. Wheeler. 100 years of the quantum. Sci.
Am., 284:68, 2001.
[Var62] V. S. Varadarajan. Probability in physics and a theorem on si-
multaneous observability. Comm. Pure and Appl. Math., 15:189,
1962.
[Var85] V. S. Varadarajan. Geometry of quantum theory. Springer, 2nd
edition, 1985.
[vN32] J. v. Neumann. Mathematische Grundlagen der
Quantenmechanik, volume 38 of Grundlehren der
Mathematischen Wissenschaften. Springer, 1932.
[Whe83] J. A. Wheeler. Law without law. In J. A. Wheeler and W. H.
Zurek, editors, Quantum Theory and Measurement, Princeton Se-
ries in Physics, pages 182–213. Princeton University Press, 1983.
[Whi00] J. Whiston. Maximal independent generating sets of the sym-
metric group. J. Algebra, 232:255, 2000.
[Wil] A. Wilce. Symmetry and composition in probabilistic theories.
In B. Coecke, P. Panangaden, and P. Selinger, editors, Proc. 6th
Workshop on Quantum Physics and Logic, Oxford, UK, April 8-
9, 2009. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, to
appear.
[Wil00] A. Wilce. Test spaces and orthoalgebras. In B. Coecke, D. Moore,
and A. Wilce, editors, Current Research in Operational Quantum
Logic: Algebras, Categories, Languages, volume 111 of Funda-
mental Theories of Physics, pages 81–114. Kluwer, 2000.
32
[Wil04] A. Wilce. Compactness and symmetry in quantum logic. In
A. Khrennikov, editor, Proc. 2nd Conference on Quantum The-
ory: Reconsideration of Foundations, Va¨xjo, Sweden, June 2003.
Va¨xjo University Press, 2004.
[Wil05a] A. Wilce. Symmetry and topology in quantum logic. Int. J.
Theor. Phys., 44:2303, 2005.
[Wil05b] A. Wilce. Topological test spaces. Int. J. Theor. Phys., 44:1227,
2005.
[Zei99] A. Zeilinger. A foundational principle for quantum mechanics.
Found. Phys., 29:631, 1999.
33
